The attempt on both sides to build a durable India-US relationship has been in the making for some 15 years, bringing closer the two “estranged” democracies. The signing of the civil nuclear agreement in 2008 with President George W. Bush’s administration provided the signal moment for the incipient ties to burgeon. Subsequently, President Barack Obama, on a visit to New Delhi last November, spoke of his country’s partnership with India as a “defining” relationship of the 21st century, as he broke an old voodoo to offer to support this country’s bid for becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Five months before that, secretary of state Hillary Clinton had already engaged external affairs minister S.M. Krishna in the first “strategic dialogue” of the two countries in Washington in June 2010, raising expectations that the reborn relationship would soon reach trajectories designed to both deepen and widen the relationship, to the mutual benefit of both. The followup second edition of the strategic dialogue — between the same two interlocutors — in New Delhi on Tuesday did live up to the promise in some ways. The two high officials, as one might expect, did scan the regional and international horizon to arrive at a broad commonality of perspectives. And yet, there does appear to linger a sense on both sides that the relationship has not gathered steam.
Perhaps the reason is that deep-going forward movement is tied too narrowly — by the United States — to issues relating to nuclear and defence sales. Unlike France and Russia, American companies that make nuclear reactors for power generation are not stepping to the plate to come to India with their wares. They are deterred by India’s nuclear liability law — which also imposes compensation responsibilities on the equipment supplier — that would kick in if an accident were to occur. After the experience of the Bhopal gas disaster, it would be hard for any government here not to make equipment suppliers liable. It may be futile for the US to shy away from this fact of life. As for India, its grouse is that in a recent meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group countries, the US did not seek to insulate India from the resolution that countries which had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could not access nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies, although following the 2008 India-US bilateral agreement the NSG had agreed to a “clean waiver” for India.
Mr S.M. Krishna and Ms Hillary Clinton did go over this ground in decorous diplomatic language. The differences needed to be aired. But it might have been better for both sides to have agreed beforehand to isolate the nuclear trade issues so that cooperation on all other fronts, including a political appreciation of different theatres of the world, would continue to be upbeat. Instead, the assessment after the second strategic dialogue remains one of a drift in ties.
America has also not hidden its disappointment over India recently not choosing its fourth-generation medium multi-role combat aircraft, although it has bought defence equipment worth $800 billion from the US recently. This is a hiccup that the two sides can get over. But the episode does underline the pitfalls of focusing the bilateral relationship too narrowly on security-related issues. A regret is that the US touched on Afghanistan — a country where developments matters deeply to this country — on Tuesday in the same terms as before, although it plans to exit in the foreseeable future. A conceptual broadening was called for.
Perhaps the reason is that deep-going forward movement is tied too narrowly — by the United States — to issues relating to nuclear and defence sales. Unlike France and Russia, American companies that make nuclear reactors for power generation are not stepping to the plate to come to India with their wares. They are deterred by India’s nuclear liability law — which also imposes compensation responsibilities on the equipment supplier — that would kick in if an accident were to occur. After the experience of the Bhopal gas disaster, it would be hard for any government here not to make equipment suppliers liable. It may be futile for the US to shy away from this fact of life. As for India, its grouse is that in a recent meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group countries, the US did not seek to insulate India from the resolution that countries which had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could not access nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies, although following the 2008 India-US bilateral agreement the NSG had agreed to a “clean waiver” for India.
Mr S.M. Krishna and Ms Hillary Clinton did go over this ground in decorous diplomatic language. The differences needed to be aired. But it might have been better for both sides to have agreed beforehand to isolate the nuclear trade issues so that cooperation on all other fronts, including a political appreciation of different theatres of the world, would continue to be upbeat. Instead, the assessment after the second strategic dialogue remains one of a drift in ties.
America has also not hidden its disappointment over India recently not choosing its fourth-generation medium multi-role combat aircraft, although it has bought defence equipment worth $800 billion from the US recently. This is a hiccup that the two sides can get over. But the episode does underline the pitfalls of focusing the bilateral relationship too narrowly on security-related issues. A regret is that the US touched on Afghanistan — a country where developments matters deeply to this country — on Tuesday in the same terms as before, although it plans to exit in the foreseeable future. A conceptual broadening was called for.
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