At a time of growing concerns about India-US relations, the second annual strategic dialogue between the two sides was held in New Delhi last week. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in India in part to restore the lustre that seems to have disappeared from the India-US ties and in part to remove doubts about America’s support for India’s core concerns. The much-hyped visit by President Barack Obama to India last November today seems a distant memory, as New Delhi and Washington have been struggling to give substance to a relationship that seems to be losing traction over the last few months in the absence of a single defining idea.
A range of issues, including terrorism, the Af-Pak situation, nuclear cooperation and India’s role in the Asia-Pacific, were on the agenda for the latest round of the strategic dialogue. On terrorism, Mrs Clinton promised to lean “hard” on Pakistan, reiterating that the US has made it clear to the Pakistan government that “confronting violent extremism of all sorts is in its interest.” She went on to underline that the US did not “believe that there are any terrorists who should be given safe havens and free pass by any government.”
Though Mrs Clinton maintained that the US remains “fully” committed to the civilian nuclear pact with India, she made it clear that there were “issues” which required to be resolved by India and the US in the civil nuclear field without going into the specifics.
More significant was her speech in Chennai where she asked India to exercise political influence in consonance with its growing economic weight in the international system. Exhorting India “to lead,” she asked New Delhi to do more to integrate economically with neighbours like Afghanistan and Pakistan and to take a more assertive role in the Asia-Pacific.
There is growing frustration in Washington about India’s inability to take a leadership role either in its immediate neighbourhood or in its extended periphery. As the situation in Afghanistan has unravelled and as China’s rise has upended the balance of power in East Asia, there was an expectation that India would be a valuable partner in bringing some semblance of stability in these regions. But India has failed to articulate a coherent policy response to these fundamental challenges to its own and regional security.
Meanwhile, many in New Delhi have argued that there have been contradictory signals from the Obama Administration on Pakistan and China, two core Indian security concerns. Despite sharing a broad convergence of interests with India, the US has been reluctant to acknowledge India’s role in Af-Pak. During the latest visit too, Mrs Clinton made it clear that there were limits to what the US can do to influence Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis terrorism and extremism.
The US has been reluctant to support a higher profile for India in Afghanistan even as many in India want to expand New Delhi’s security footprint in that country. As the Obama Administration’s plans to end the combat role of American military in Afghanistan by 2014 have become more concrete, the choices for India are getting limited, especially as there has been little change in the mindset of the Pakistani security apparatus that having a pliable government is crucial in order to have a strategic depth vis-à-vis India.
Meanwhile, the last big idea that transformed the nature of the India-US ties under the Bush Administration is also facing setbacks. A few weeks back at its 2011 plenary meeting in the Netherlands, the 46-nation nuclear cartel, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), came up with new guidelines regarding the tightening of exports of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Though the exact formulation of the new guidelines have not been made public, they seem to underscore that the transfer of sensitive ENR technologies will exclude nations which are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not have full-scope safeguards. This has led to an intense debate in India as it seems to go against the spirit of the NSG exemption granted in 2008. In an unprecedented move, the NSG gave a crucial waiver to New Delhi, enabling it to carry out nuclear commerce, and ended 34 years of India’s isolation from international mainstream in the wake of the 1974 nuclear tests.
But the Obama Administration’s ideological rigidity on non-proliferation is showing signs of destroying the hard won gains from the nuclear rapprochement between India and the US. The Obama Administration’s support for the new ENR guidelines also stems from its ideological commitment to the extant nuclear non-proliferation regime. Successive US Administrations have viewed nuclear proliferation as the biggest threat to the American and global security, but unlike its predecessor the present dispensation in Washington DC believes that the regime framework needs to be strengthened to counter the proliferation threat. Mrs Clinton’s latest visit has failed to allay Indian concerns fully.
The two governments in New Delhi and Washington DC are, for different reasons, constrained from taking their bilateral relationship any further. Both are consumed by domestic challenges. As a consequence, the last two years have witnessed a lot of rhetoric but very little substantive movement. Today there is no big defining idea in the relationship and even the nuclear deal which got both bureaucracies united for some time is facing critical issues. In the short-to-medium term, the India-US relationship will remain circumscribed. On the nuclear deal, New Delhi cannot give Washington DC what it wants, and on Af-Pak, Washington DC can’t deliver what India wants. India can indeed be an important partner of the US in managing the changing strategic landscape in Af-Pak and the Asia-Pacific. But to achieve the full potential of such a partnership, the US will have to acknowledge Indian security interests and India will have to take a leadership role.
A range of issues, including terrorism, the Af-Pak situation, nuclear cooperation and India’s role in the Asia-Pacific, were on the agenda for the latest round of the strategic dialogue. On terrorism, Mrs Clinton promised to lean “hard” on Pakistan, reiterating that the US has made it clear to the Pakistan government that “confronting violent extremism of all sorts is in its interest.” She went on to underline that the US did not “believe that there are any terrorists who should be given safe havens and free pass by any government.”
Though Mrs Clinton maintained that the US remains “fully” committed to the civilian nuclear pact with India, she made it clear that there were “issues” which required to be resolved by India and the US in the civil nuclear field without going into the specifics.
More significant was her speech in Chennai where she asked India to exercise political influence in consonance with its growing economic weight in the international system. Exhorting India “to lead,” she asked New Delhi to do more to integrate economically with neighbours like Afghanistan and Pakistan and to take a more assertive role in the Asia-Pacific.
There is growing frustration in Washington about India’s inability to take a leadership role either in its immediate neighbourhood or in its extended periphery. As the situation in Afghanistan has unravelled and as China’s rise has upended the balance of power in East Asia, there was an expectation that India would be a valuable partner in bringing some semblance of stability in these regions. But India has failed to articulate a coherent policy response to these fundamental challenges to its own and regional security.
Meanwhile, many in New Delhi have argued that there have been contradictory signals from the Obama Administration on Pakistan and China, two core Indian security concerns. Despite sharing a broad convergence of interests with India, the US has been reluctant to acknowledge India’s role in Af-Pak. During the latest visit too, Mrs Clinton made it clear that there were limits to what the US can do to influence Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis terrorism and extremism.
The US has been reluctant to support a higher profile for India in Afghanistan even as many in India want to expand New Delhi’s security footprint in that country. As the Obama Administration’s plans to end the combat role of American military in Afghanistan by 2014 have become more concrete, the choices for India are getting limited, especially as there has been little change in the mindset of the Pakistani security apparatus that having a pliable government is crucial in order to have a strategic depth vis-à-vis India.
Meanwhile, the last big idea that transformed the nature of the India-US ties under the Bush Administration is also facing setbacks. A few weeks back at its 2011 plenary meeting in the Netherlands, the 46-nation nuclear cartel, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), came up with new guidelines regarding the tightening of exports of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Though the exact formulation of the new guidelines have not been made public, they seem to underscore that the transfer of sensitive ENR technologies will exclude nations which are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not have full-scope safeguards. This has led to an intense debate in India as it seems to go against the spirit of the NSG exemption granted in 2008. In an unprecedented move, the NSG gave a crucial waiver to New Delhi, enabling it to carry out nuclear commerce, and ended 34 years of India’s isolation from international mainstream in the wake of the 1974 nuclear tests.
But the Obama Administration’s ideological rigidity on non-proliferation is showing signs of destroying the hard won gains from the nuclear rapprochement between India and the US. The Obama Administration’s support for the new ENR guidelines also stems from its ideological commitment to the extant nuclear non-proliferation regime. Successive US Administrations have viewed nuclear proliferation as the biggest threat to the American and global security, but unlike its predecessor the present dispensation in Washington DC believes that the regime framework needs to be strengthened to counter the proliferation threat. Mrs Clinton’s latest visit has failed to allay Indian concerns fully.
The two governments in New Delhi and Washington DC are, for different reasons, constrained from taking their bilateral relationship any further. Both are consumed by domestic challenges. As a consequence, the last two years have witnessed a lot of rhetoric but very little substantive movement. Today there is no big defining idea in the relationship and even the nuclear deal which got both bureaucracies united for some time is facing critical issues. In the short-to-medium term, the India-US relationship will remain circumscribed. On the nuclear deal, New Delhi cannot give Washington DC what it wants, and on Af-Pak, Washington DC can’t deliver what India wants. India can indeed be an important partner of the US in managing the changing strategic landscape in Af-Pak and the Asia-Pacific. But to achieve the full potential of such a partnership, the US will have to acknowledge Indian security interests and India will have to take a leadership role.
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